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Abstract 
This article reviews current knowledge about how the tendency to reflect on 
personal experience is related to the tendency to take another’s perspective. While it 
is well established that self-reflection leads to a greater understanding of one’s own 
emotions, cognitions, and behaviours, the extent to which it is associated with 
understanding others is less well understood, despite the implications of this for the 
development of more effective interventions to improve empathy. The types of self-
reflection that are used in clinical and psychotherapeutic interventions are used to 
illustrate the possibilities here, and ways in which clinicians may increase their own 
self-reflection are also considered. 
Keywords: perspective taking, self-reflection, insight, rumination, empathy, past 
experience 




Understanding others is central to the development of positive and satisfying 
relationships. However, despite likely association between reflecting on one’s own 
thoughts, feelings, and experiences and imagining those of others, the relationship 
between self-reflection and perspective taking has received surprisingly limited 
research attention. It has, for example, been argued that self-reflection and 
perspective taking “be seen as part of the same general domain—that of constructs 
having to do with awareness of and sensitivity to psychological states, motives, and 
behavioral tendencies: in one case … the attention is self-directed, and in the other … 
it is other-directed” (Davis & Franzoi, 1991, p. 72). Indeed, self-awareness has been 
shown to lead to a number of beneficial outcomes (e.g., understanding of emotions, 
cognitions, and behaviours) which, in turn, are inherent in the process of perspective 
taking. The aim of this review is to develop thinking in this area further by 
reviewing current evidence that self-reflection plays a key role in the perspective-
taking process. In particular, the focus will be on understanding the importance of 
reflecting upon and developing insight into one’s own past experiences in order to 
take the perspectives of others in similar situations. 
Dymond (1950), in defining empathy, effectively captured the meaning of 
perspective taking as “the imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, 
feeling, and acting of another” (p. 343). Later conceptualisations, which place less 
emphasis on the process-nature of this core cognitive component of empathy, define 
perspective taking as “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point 
of view of others” (Davis, 1983, pp. 113-114), or more specifically as “cognitively 
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trying to understand the other’s internal mental states” (Eisenberg & Okun, 1996, p. 
158). While the ability to take another’s perspective clearly requires an appreciation 
or understanding of the psychological vantage point of the other person, strategies 
used to take another person’s perspective often involve reflecting upon and utilising 
one’s own perspective and experiences. These include: mentally switching places 
with the other person (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Stotland, 1969); using 
one’s own perspective as a starting point or “anchor” to understand the other person 
(e.g., Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004); projection or stereotype use to 
infer the mental states of others (e.g., Ames, 2004); relating what the person is going 
through to a similar experience in one’s own past (e.g. Batson et al., 1996); and using 
heuristics for understanding another’s experiences (e.g., Karniol & Shomroni 1999). 
More general explanations of how we accomplish an understanding of others, 
including simulation theory (e.g., A. I. Goldman, 1989/1995; R. M. Gordon, 
1986/1995) and theory of mind accounts (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992, 1994) have also highlighted the importance of the self to the process.  
Recent social psychological work (e.g., Gerace, Day, Casey, & Mohr, 2013) has 
reconceptualised perspective taking as a process whereby self-information (e.g., 
imagining what it would be like to be in another’s situation) and other-information 
(e.g., considering what led up to another’s situation) are used either simultaneously 
or alternately by the empathiser to understand the other’s perspective. This is 
supported by data from studies in which participants in either an imagine-self or 
imagine-other condition report imagining their own feelings as well as the feelings 
of the target person (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Davis et al., 2004). Indeed, both shared 
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and unique neural networks are activated when a person focuses on their own 
versus another’s perspective (Ruby & Decety, 2004).     
Understanding and reflecting on past experiences is also likely to be 
important in many of the strategies used to apprehend another’s perspective. 
Reflection on one’s own past experiences (e.g., relationship problems; bereavement) 
makes it easier to take the viewpoint of another person in a similar situation, but this 
requires both increased perceptions of similarity and cognitive processing of the 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours that accompanied one’s own experience (see 
Gerace, Day, Casey, & Mohr, 2015). However, while this process is subjectively 
easier, evidence is mixed as to whether having experienced a similar situation to 
another person leads the empathiser to form a more accurate understanding of that 
person’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., Hodges, Kiel, Kramer, Veach, & Villaneuva, 
2010). In this article, it will be argued that to the extent that reflection is motivated by 
self-concerns or a ruminative focus on past events, perspective taking is inhibited 
and the positive aspects of using self-knowledge and past experiences to understand 
another are diminished. By contrast, when self-reflection is driven by a need to 
develop insight and understanding into one’s own experiences, the person is likely 
to be more successful in understanding the perspective of another person who finds 
himself or herself in a similar situation.  
We begin by examining the concept of self-reflection, applying two dominant 
theoretical models. We then examine the relationship between self-reflection and 
perspective taking in theoretical and empirical work. In this work, self-reflection has 
been found to be accompanied by increased self-knowledge in understanding one’s 
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own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, as well as a more accurate understanding of 
the other person’s unique and separate perspective. From this examination, it is 
apparent that considering the type of self-reflection in which an individual engages is 
important for understanding its role in perspective taking. To this end, we present 
factor analytic work on measures of self-reflection and investigations of the 
relationship of perspective taking to different types of reflection. In these studies, 
perspective taking was negatively associated with rumination and positively 
associated with more-positively framed abstract self-reflection. In order to 
understand the ways in which people may move beyond ruminating on problematic 
experiences, we outline clinical research and psychological models of change that 
suggest that focusing on past problematic experiences involves a process of 
reflection, assimilation, and understanding of these experiences. It is at this 
insightful and distanced thinking about past experiences that we believe the person 
is able to more successfully take the perspective of another person. Finally, we 
discuss potential directions for future research, as well as general approaches to 
therapy and intervention to provide ways that self-reflection and perspective taking 
can be increased in close relationships. While perspective taking, and we would 
argue self-reflection, play a central role in all interpersonal interactions (Vorauer & 
Cameron, 2002), unique aspects of closer relationships are likely to influence how 
self-reflection and perspective taking may be related.  
What Is Self-Reflection? 
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For the past 40 years, two conceptualisations have guided investigations into 
self-reflection: self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and self-
consciousness theory (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). According to the theory of 
self-awareness, often known as objective self-awareness theory, attention at any 
given time is either self-directed or externally oriented. Self-directed or objective self-
awareness is a state where “consciousness is focused exclusively upon the self and 
consequently the individual attends to his conscious state, his personal history, his 
body, or any other personal aspects of himself” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, p. 2). In 
contrast, externally oriented or subjective self-awareness, suggested to be the 
standard attentional state of individuals, involves attention being focused on the 
external environment. Unlike the state of subjective self-awareness, which is 
characterised by feelings of direction and control (since the individual is the 
“subject” and his or her environment is the “object”), objective self-awareness as 
originally proposed often has somewhat negative undertones (for more recent 
conceptions, see Silvia & Duval, 2001). This is said to occur because self-focused 
attention has an evaluative component: the self is compared with standards 
regarding various parts of the self (e.g., behaviour), and an evaluation is made 
regarding the degree of discrepancy between the self and those standards. When 
discrepancy and negative affect are apparent, attempts are made to resolve the 
discrepancy (e.g., through a change in behaviour) or avoid objective self-awareness 
and, consequently, the evaluation and resulting affect (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; for 
another conception, see Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). Self-focus, whereby the person 
sees themselves as an “object” in the environment, can be facilitated with the use of 
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mirrors, photographs, tape recorders, and through the presence of other persons 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972).   
Whereas the two states of self-awareness posited in the theory of objective 
self-awareness are induced by situational factors, the pervasive and trait nature of 
self-reflection is stressed in the concept of self-consciousness, defined as “the 
consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward or outward” (Fenigstein et 
al., 1975, p. 522). A number of criteria informed construction of the Self-
Consciousness Scale:  
 
(a) preoccupation with past, present, and future behavior; (b) 
sensitivity to inner feelings; (c) recognition of one’s positive and 
negative attributes; (d) introspective behavior; (e) a tendency to 
picture or imagine oneself; (f) awareness of one’s physical 
appearance and presentation; and (g) concern over the appraisal 
of others. (Fenigstein et al., 1975, p. 523)   
 
On the basis of factor analysis of an item pool derived from these criteria, three 
subscales were identified: private self-consciousness (i.e., “attending to one’s 
thoughts and feelings”), public self-consciousness (“a general awareness of the self 
as a social object that has an effect on others”; Fenigstein et al., 1975, p. 523); and 
social anxiety, which was significantly positively correlated with public self-
consciousness, but unrelated to private self-consciousness. While private and public 
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self-consciousness were interpreted as process-oriented, social anxiety was seen as 
outcome-oriented.   
 
Outcomes of Self-Reflection 
Much of the early work on self-consciousness investigated the two theories in 
the same studies; this mostly took the form of researchers examining the effects of 
dispositional self-reflection (self-consciousness) and situational self-reflection (self-
awareness). The difference between the theories focused upon at this earlier stage 
was this state-trait distinction. It was only later that debate intensified between 
proponents of each theory regarding problems with the other in accounting for 
conceptual questions and empirical findings regarding self-reflection and awareness 
(see Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1987; 
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). However, it is now generally recognised that overall 
experimental findings vary little regardless of the particular theoretical 
underpinning of the studies (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979). Therefore, it is at the 
explanatory level that the studies differ: one theory (objective self-awareness theory) 
posits self-discrepancy reduction or consistency concerns (e.g., Pryor, Gibbons, 
Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977), while the other (self-consciousness) invokes more 
self-knowledge oriented needs (e.g., Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978). 
The central finding from the early body of research is that manipulated or 
dispositional self-focus results in increased concordance between self-reports and 
objective benchmarks (e.g., academic performance, emotionally-inducing stimuli) 
and behaviour (e.g., sociability, aggression; Pryor et al., 1977; Scheier et al., 1978; 
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Scheier & Carver, 1977; Turner & Peterson, 1977), as well as higher levels of self-
focus reflected in cognitive tasks (e.g., sentence completion; Carver & Scheier, 1978), 
and attributions of heightened self-responsibility (D. M. Buss & Scheier, 1976). 
Several studies have examined the importance of trait versus state attention. In one 
early study, the effect of private self-consciousness was statistically stronger than 
that of mirror-induced self-awareness (Buss & Scheier, 1976). There was also an 
interaction effect where dispositional self-reflection and state self-reflection seemed 
to have an additive effect in negative situations, while in positive situations high and 
low private self-consciousness participants were most differentiated in self-
attributions when state self-awareness was not manipulated (see Hass, 1984, for 
results in a similar direction for public self-consciousness and non-manipulated state 
self-awareness). In another study, a small interaction effect (at p < .08) was apparent 
between high or low private self-consciousness (obtained via median split) and 
presence or absence of a mirror, such that low self-consciousness participants were 
more self-focused when exposed to a mirror (Carver & Scheier, 1978). In this case, a 
ceiling-type effect was advanced for the lack of effect for high private self-conscious 
participants when they were exposed to their reflection. In addition, private self-
consciousness was correlated with self-focus measured using proportion of 
participants’ self-focused completion of sentences; when this correlation was 
calculated separately for the two levels of the manipulation, it was significant only 
for the no-mirror group. While these studies provide information on the outcomes of 
self-reflection, it is important to examine specific theoretical and empirical treatment 
of the influence of self-reflection on perspective taking. 




The Relationship Between Self-Reflection and Perspective Taking 
 The interdependence of self-reflection and perspective taking for the notion of 
self is the foundation of earlier work in the symbolic interactionist tradition and 
related schools of thought. For theorists, it was the very process of taking another’s 
perspective that led to a state of self-awareness, rather than self-reflection informing 
the understanding of another person’s perspective. In one of the early conceptions, 
Cooley (1902/1967) suggested that: 
 
In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference 
takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one’s 
self—that is any idea he appropriates—appears in a particular 
mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the 
attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of 
this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self. (pp. 
183-184) 
 
Similarly, Mead (1913, 1934/1950, 1936/1964) considered the development of 
self and self-consciousness to be fundamentally based on taking the perspective of 
another (both the specific and generalised other) toward the self. The site at which 
this occurred was the social act, which contains various social positions, as well as 
specific perspectives that are associated with these positions (Gillespie, 2006; Mead, 
1934/1950).  
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Notions of self-awareness are also fundamental to theories of human 
development. Piaget (1928/1965) conceived of a child as initially being unaware of 
their own thought processes, where egocentrism impedes logic and perspective 
taking is at a minimum. The concrete-operational stage of cognitive development, 
which is conceptualised as beginning around 7 years of age, entails growth in 
perspective-taking ability, whereby the child is able to better differentiate between 
and consider their own and another person’s perspective (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1966/1969). The development of an understanding regarding self and other 
perspectives drives the ability to both self-reflect and take the perspective of the 
other. Selman’s (1980) later theory of the development of social perspective taking 
stresses the importance of self-reflection within the development of this cognitive 
empathic response. At level 2 (approximately ages 7-12 years), children are able to 
an outsider’s perspective on their thoughts and behaviours and more generally take 
the perspective of the other. This self-reflection is built upon at level 3 
(approximately ages 10-15 years), and a third-person perspective emerges, whereby 
consideration of multiple perspectives (i.e., both self and other) and coordination of 
these perspectives are simultaneously possible.  
In studies stemming from self-awareness theory and the self-consciousness 
perspective that directly investigated the self-reflection and perspective taking 
relationship, self-awareness was often induced first, examining the impact that 
reflection had on taking others’ perspectives. These studies suggest that when 
participants are made self-aware they take an outsider’s perspective on their own 
thoughts and behaviours, which is consonant with theories of self-reflection that 
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propose the importance of another perspective on one’s own behaviour (Diener & 
Srull, 1979; Hass, 1984). In one study involving self-reinforcement tasks, participants 
adhered more to socially-derived standards than to personal standards when made 
self-aware (with a television screen and an audio recording), and adhered more to 
personal standards than to social standards when not made self-aware (Diener & 
Srull, 1979). In a series of studies, participants who were made self-aware (through 
the presence of a video camera or audio recorder) prior to beginning the task more 
often outlined the letter E on their forehead backwards, making it a correct 
orientation for an external person (Hass, 1984). However, dispositional private or 
public self-consciousness had little effect on the behaviour of participants. These 
findings involving perceptual perspective taking have much in common with earlier 
work, where participants who watched themselves on videotape provided relatively 
more dispositional attributions for behaviour (akin to the perspective of an 
observer), in comparison to the usual situational focus inherent in the actor-observer 
effect (Storms, 1973; see also Jones & Nisbett, 1971).  
The relationship between dispositional rather than situationally-induced self-
reflection and perspective taking has been examined. Two experiments by Bernstein 
and Davis (1982) investigated the influences of a participant’s trait perspective 
taking (using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980) and a real target’s 
private self-consciousness, on the accuracy of the participants’ matching of targets to 
self-descriptions. In the first study, participants high in perspective taking 
(determined via a median split) were more accurate in matching self-descriptions to 
10 targets who they had watched on video discussing a problem. In the second 
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study, participants found it easier to predict targets that were higher in private self-
consciousness. Interactions were found first for perspective taking by tape length, 
and second for private self-consciousness by tape length, indicating that the effects 
of both variables were more prevalent for longer videotapes. These results were 
interpreted as reflecting the greater opportunity for participants to use their 
perspective-taking ability with more information (thus avoiding problems such as 
projection), as well as increased tape length providing more information on a target 
who had provided more adequate self-descriptions. Both studies point to the similar 
functions of perspective taking and self-reflection in understanding and interpreting 
either another’s or one’s own emotions, cognitions, and behaviours. In one of the 
few studies that has investigated private self-consciousness and perspective taking 
within intimate relationships (Franzoi, Davis, & Young, 1985), private self-
consciousness and perspective taking both predicted relationship satisfaction in 
heterosexual dating couples, with the private self-consciousness and satisfaction 
association mediated by degree of self-disclosure. Unfortunately, the extent to which 
self-reflection (or self-disclosure) is implicated in perspective taking and relationship 
satisfaction was not a focus of this investigation. 
Collectively, these results suggest that improvement in perspective-taking 
ability may be facilitated through awareness of differences between self and other 
perspectives via self-focused attention. At the same time, specific concerns such as 
time-pressures (Darley & Batson, 1973) or self-validational needs (Gollwitzer & 
Wicklund, 1985) have been found to compromise perspective taking and empathic 
responses. Across three experiments (Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983), participants 
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who were made self-aware (through audio or visual means) made fewer 
perspective-taking errors such as attributing privileged knowledge to a target or 
exhibited increased perspective taking (where this was measured) than both a 
control and a self-aware group who were also exposed to a personal concern 
condition (e.g., being told that their questionnaire responses would be assessed for 
neuroticism). These results suggest that it is imperative to consider the nature or 
“types” of self-focus that individuals undertake, particularly the affective and 
motivational aspects underlying such self-reflection.  
 
Types of Reflection 
 Self-reflection has been hypothesised and empirically shown as being related 
to perspective taking, as well as to increases in self-knowledge, self-attribution, and 
more general self-focus. However, these findings do not provide much information 
on the nature of this self-reflection. It could be argued that the type of self-reflection 
that individuals undertake (e.g., a ruminative-type focus) would determine the 
relationship to both investigated outcomes of reflection, as well as perspective 
taking. In addition, self-reflection, like perspective taking, is used in the service of 
some goal (e.g., better understanding of a relevant aspect of the self; the reduction in 
a discrepancy or self-defensive reasons—see Franzoi, Davis, & Markwiese, 1990), so 
that the motivation for such reflection becomes important to also address. 
 
Psychometric Investigation of Types of Self-Reflection 
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Many of these issues have actually been addressed within psychometric work 
on the private self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975) described above, which measures reflection on one’s own thoughts and 
feelings. This work indicates that there are at least two distinctive types of private 
self-consciousness tapped by the scale (e.g., Abrams, 1988; Anderson, Bohon, & 
Berrigan, 1996; K. M. Cramer, 2000; Kingree & Ruback, 1996; A. J. Martin & Debus, 
1999; Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987; Piliavin & Charng, 1988; cf. Bissonnette & 
Bernstein, 1990; Britt, 1992), with differing relationships between these types of 
reflection and various intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes.  
Drawing on the work of A. H. Buss (1980), Burnkrant and Page (1984) divided 
private self-consciousness items into two factors: internal state awareness (i.e., of 
affect, mood, and so on) and self-reflectiveness (e.g., heightened self-focus, self-
related inquiry). In two studies using confirmatory factor analysis, there was greater 
support for the appropriateness of a two-factor model of private self-consciousness 
over a one-dimensional model. Based on their own factor analytic and correlational 
work, Anderson et al. (1996) suggested that these subscales be differently 
conceptualised, with self-reflectiveness considered “a negative and oppressive style 
of private self-consciousness, a style characterized by self-mistrust and ruminative 
self-preoccupation” (named self-oppression), and internal state awareness “a more 
neutral and perhaps mildly positive style of private self-consciousness, one 
characterized by interest and attention” (named balanced self-awareness; p. 150). 
Similarly, it has been suggested that items can be grouped into two categories: those 
items involving a negative ruminative-type focus that is fairly overarching in its 
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scope; and other items that relate more to being attuned to aspects of the self (e.g., 
feelings, problem-solving techniques), which is related to self-regulation (A. J. 
Martin & Debus, 1999). In studies in which a two-factor structure was adopted, self-
reflectiveness items were negatively related to self-esteem and positively associated 
with depression and anxiety, with the inverse apparent for internal state awareness 
items (Anderson et al., 1996; Höping, de Jong-Meyer, & Abrams, 2006; Kingree & 
Ruback, 1996; Piliavin & Charng, 1988).  
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) suggested that self-consciousness, and in 
particular private self-consciousness, should be further theorised as involving 
motives and values that determine the nature of an individual’s self-focus. Based on 
a series of studies utilising several thousand participants, measures of rumination 
and reflection were developed (Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire [RRQ]). 
Whereas the conceptualisation of rumination stressed “a general, neurotic category 
of self-attentiveness … prompted by threats, losses, or injustices to the self”, 
reflection was considered more intellective, motivated by “pleasurable, intrinsic 
interest in abstract or philosophical thinking” (p. 292) rather than distress. The 
subsequent scales were psychometrically distinct, and both were significantly 
correlated with the original private self-consciousness measure. Associations were 
found between rumination and neuroticism-related concepts (e.g., anxiety, 
depression, negative affect), and between reflection and openness to experience-
related concepts (e.g., need for cognition, personal identity-related measures), as 
well as a relationship between volunteering for psychology studies and reflection, 
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suggested to indicate differences between those high and low on this trait in 
knowledge-related needs.  
 Few studies have examined the relationship between rumination and 
reflection using the RRQ and perspective taking, as well as the relationship between 
these types of self-reflection and past experience. In one of the few studies, 
relationships between the measures and perspective taking (using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index [IRI]; Davis, 1980) were relatively straightforward, with reflection 
significantly positively associated with perspective taking and rumination 
significantly negatively associated with perspective taking (Joireman, Parrott, & 
Hammersla, 2002b). Rumination was significantly positively associated with two 
affective components of empathy: empathic concern, which involves compassionate 
and sympathetic feelings for another person; and personal distress, which involves 
self-focused discomfort and unease when exposed to another person’s troublesome 
experiences (Batson et al., 1997). Reflection was also significantly positively 
associated with empathic concern, although the inclusion of perspective taking and 
personal distress on a second step in regression analysis rendered this relationship 
non-significant (relationships between reflection and rumination and perspective 
taking and personal distress remained significant when other empathy measures 
were included).      
 In a follow-up study (Joireman, 2004), reflection and rumination mediated 
relationships between perspective taking and personal distress and guilt and shame. 
Most important to the present discussion regarding self-reflection and perspective 
taking, reflection partially mediated the relationship between guilt (predictor 
Self-reflection and another person’s perspective 
19 
 
variable) and perspective taking (outcome variable). However, a hypothesised 
empathic concern model mirroring this perspective taking model was not supported. 
In addition, models where rumination mediated the relationship between shame 
(predictor) and personal distress (outcome) or shame mediated the relationship 
between rumination (predictor) and personal distress were supported.  
The relationships between reflection and rumination and autobiographical 
memory were investigated in a study whereby participants generated memories 
related to a set of neutral cue words (Teasdale & Green, 2004). Rumination was 
negatively related to feelings of happiness and “at-oneness” at the time of the event, 
and was positively related to feelings of unhappiness at the time of the event; only 
“at-oneness” remained a significant predictor in regression analyses including all 
three types of affect. Reflection was not significantly related to the nature of the 
event. Support for the role of higher order constructs in the rumination and memory 
relationship was provided when a measure of neuroticism was included with 
rumination in regression analysis predicting “at-oneness”. In this analysis 
neuroticism but not rumination was a significant predictor. 
Another measure of self-reflection, the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS; 
Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002), which consists of two scales, examines not only 
dispositional self-reflection, but also the nature of that reflection. The Self-Reflection 
scale (SRIS-SR) measures an individual’s propensity to engage in reflection on their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, together with the extent to which the individual 
feels the need to engage in this process. The Insight scale (SRIS-IN) measures an 
individual’s understanding of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours.  
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In three validation studies, the SRIS-SR was significantly positively correlated 
with anxiety and stress measured using the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995); the SRIS-IN was significantly negatively correlated 
with these measures (and depression on that scale). Both measures significantly 
correlated with the original measure of private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 
1975) – the SRIS-SR positively and the SRIS-IN negatively – and insight correlated 
significantly and negatively with the 20-item version of the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) and significantly and positively with the 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (M. M. Martin & Rubin, 1995) and the Self-Control 
Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980). The two scales were not significantly associated in one 
of the validation studies and significantly negatively associated in another of the 
studies.  
Finally, associations between both self-reflection and perspective taking and 
other psychological processes suggest that individuals disposed, encouraged, or 
experimentally manipulated to self-reflect exhibit more valid (accurate) or insightful 
processing of experiences and taking the perspectives of others. For example, one 
study (Beitel, Ferrer, & Cecero, 2005) found that private self-consciousness, 
perspective taking, and empathic concern positively predicted psychological 
mindedness in regression analysis. 
This work on reflection, rumination, and insight raises important concerns for 
the present discussion and the investigation of self-reflection and perspective taking. 
While definitions of reflection denote an understanding and search regarding 
aspects of the self that is conducive to perspective taking (if, as the current 
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examination suggests, reflection on past experiences and its accompanying thoughts 
and feelings leads to an application to the other’s situation), the definition of 
rumination has a particular focus on past experience and problematic experiences. 
Indeed, past experiences – at least those investigated in previous studies (e.g., 
relationship problems, bereavement; see Batson, 2011) – would likely contain an 
aspect of ruminative self-focus by the very nature of their affective tone and impact 
on the individual’s life. Research in the area of self-reflection and perspective taking 
would suggest that self-reflection can only be effective as a process of switching 
between one’s own perspective and that of another when more self-oriented 
concerns are absent. As such, what needs to be accounted for is how past experience 
reflection can lead to beneficial (e.g. accurate, relationship-enhancing, or easy) 
outcomes, when these experiences are often negative. In the final section, clinical 
theory and research with a particular focus on past experience is used to provide a 
potential answer. 
 
Self-Reflection in Clinical Theory and Practice 
Self-Reflection and Psychological Disorders 
There is a large body of research examining the relationship between self-
reflection and psychological disorders, particularly depression (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Hamilton, & Nix, 1991). In a review of this 
literature, Ingram (1990) suggested that self-focused attention is a common feature of 
several psychopathologies (e.g., depression, anxiety), is implicated in the underlying 
features of other disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, psychopathy), and may serve both 
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an initiation and intensification function in relation to negative affect (cf. 
Pyszczynski et al., 1991).   
In Mor and Winquist’s (2002) meta-analysis investigating the relationship 
between self-focused attention and negative affect, weighted mean effect sizes for 
149 correlational studies and 72 experimental studies involving a self-focus 
manipulation were 0.51 and 0.44, respectively. Stronger positive associations 
between self-focus and negative affect were present for: clinical and subclinical 
samples versus non-clinical samples; rumination versus non-ruminative self-focus; 
public self-consciousness versus private self-consciousness; attention to negative 
versus positive aspects of the self; the aftermath of a negative versus positive event; 
and depression versus anxiety. The direction of the relationship between self-
focused attention and negative affect was also examined, with moderate effect sizes 
found that did not differ significantly in magnitude between studies employing a 
self-focus manipulation, studies manipulating negative affect, and correlational 
studies that did not involve a manipulation. The authors concluded that “these 
results seem to support the reciprocity of the relationship between self-focus and NA 
[negative affect]” (p. 650). 
In Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) influential response styles theory, rumination is 
implicated in depression through retrieval of more negative memories and past 
experiences, increased focus on current problems, and pessimistic expectations for 
the future; interference with problem solving and instrumental behaviour; and 
reduced social support (for a review of studies, see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). Indeed, in a study of the psychometric properties of Nolen-
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Hoeksema’s Ruminative Responses Scale (see Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), a 
two-factor model similar to that of Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) Reflection and 
Rumination scales was supported. The factors were reflection, “a purposeful turning 
inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive 
symptoms”; and brooding, “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with 
some unachieved standard” (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003, p. 256). 
Ingram (1990) developed a conceptualisation of self-reflection or focus 
relevant to psychopathology. This stressed three important variables or parameters: 
degree of focused attention on the self (particularly in comparison to focus external to 
the self; these two constructs are formulated as existing along a continuum); duration 
of this focused attention; and flexibility in attention change. It was suggested that 
maladaptive self-focused attention, or self-absorption, is characteristic of an 
excessive degree of self-focus, for an extended period of time, and with limited 
change in direction of attention. The content of the self-absorption is related to the 
activation of a particular schema, which, according to Ingram, explains differences 
between disorders with regard to self-related thought. 
 
Clinical Research and Psychological Models of Change 
While the work described above did not examine self-reflection and 
perspective taking directly, it suggests that thinking about one’s own past 
experiences in the service of perspective taking could be seen as involving a 
temporary shift away from the person with whom one is empathising toward a self-
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focus, but to a degree whereby thinking has not become solely self-focused, 
ruminative, or brooding (Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Takano & Tanno, 2009).  
The actual content of self-related thought would also need to be of a certain 
quality. Much like perspective taking only being sufficient to the extent that the 
individual is accurate about the cognitions and emotions of the other person, the 
self-reflection most needed would be one where the individual has veridical 
assessment of their cognitions, emotions, and behaviours in the previous situation, 
so that these can be applied to a new situation and another person. The notion of 
insight into, or accurate self-knowledge of, oneself, which was introduced earlier, is 
particularly important here. Insight has actually been studied alongside empathy. 
For example, in a series of studies on empathy, Dymond investigated both insight 
into the relationship patterns one has with others (Dymond, 1948) and insight into 
one’s own personality traits (Dymond, 1949, 1950). Finding that insight and empathy 
were positively related, Dymond suggested that “empathy may be one of the 
underlying mechanisms on which insight is based” (1948, p. 233).  
While the notion of or term insight is somewhat more specific to certain 
therapies than others, most cognitive-related psychotherapies address inaccurate 
cognitions and attempt to generate more accurate self-knowledge (Beck, 1976/1989; 
Meichenbaum, 1977). Indeed, introspection and thinking about past experiences 
through imagery are described as ways to examine cognitions, as well as to uncover 
dominant errors in thinking and underlying attitudes and beliefs (Shaw & Beck, 
1977; Young, Rygh, Weinberger, & Beck, 2008). Similarly, rational-emotive therapy 
involves the detection, examination, and active challenge of one’s irrational beliefs 
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regarding events (the A-B-C theory where Belief mediates between an Activating 
event and a Consequence), resulting in the development of new beliefs (or effect; 
Ellis, 1977, 1991). In insight-oriented psychotherapies (e.g., Freudian psychoanalysis, 
Jungian analysis, person-centered psychotherapy), it is the process of self-
exploration that is said to lead to an accurate or truthful uncovering of information 
(Jopling, 2001).  
The idea of working toward understanding of and insight into past 
experiences (and their underlying cognitive, emotional, and behavioural aspects) 
seems vital in the case of the present examination. Indeed, processing or thinking 
deeply about a specific past experience is unlikely to happen solely in the moment 
when one is empathising with another person in a similar situation. Instead, it is 
likely that the use of past experience involves applying past experience to the new 
situation in the moment, but also consideration and processing of one’s own 
situation outside of the specific perspective-taking episode. Models of 
psychotherapeutic stages of change stress the process of working toward such an 
understanding. According to the assimilation model (Stiles et al., 1990; Stiles, 2001), 
change involves assimilation and accommodation of problematic experiences (into 
schema. This process occurs in a number of stages, beginning with limited 
awareness of the problem to awareness and clarification of the problem and related 
insight, working through the problem, and moving toward problem solution and 
mastery (see Day, Bryan, Davey, & Casey, 2006; Honos-Webb, Stiles, & Greenberg, 
2003; Stiles, 2001). As Stiles (2001) suggests: 
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Another way to formulate the change process is using the 
metaphor of voice … This metaphor expresses the theoretical 
suggestion that the traces of past experiences are active agents 
within people and are capable of communication. The traces can 
act and speak. Dissociated (unassimilated) voices tend to be 
problems, whereas assimilated voices can be resources, available 
when circumstances call for their capacities and talents. The 
interlinked traces of experiences that have been assimilated 
previously can be considered as a community of voices within the 
person. (pp. 462-463) 
 
Ways to Think About Experiences 
In this final section, we examine social psychological, neuroscientific, and 
clinical research that has investigated the perspectives an individual may take 
toward the experiences of others and their own experiences. What emerges from this 
research is that reflecting on thoughts, feelings, and behaviours from a distanced 
perspective or moving away from one’s own point of view may be beneficial for 
development of the insight and assimilation described above. 
There have been several studies that have investigated outcomes of asking 
participants to take another person’s perspective in one of two ways (e.g., Batson et 
al., 1997; Batson et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2004; Stotland, 1969). In these studies, which 
often focused on empathic emotion or altruism, participants were asked to examine 
another person’s situation from either an imagine-self perspective, where 
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participants imagine themselves in the other person’s place, or an imagine-other 
perspective, where participants focus on how the other person feels about their 
experiences (Batson et al., 1997). A third control or comparison condition tends to 
discourage the participant from taking the perspective of the other person, instead 
asking them to remain objective. 
In these studies, differences between participants in imagine-self and 
imagine-other groups have been observed on physiological, self-report, and 
behavioural measures. In Stotland’s (1969) seminal study, participants received one 
of the three perspective-taking instructions and watched while an experimental 
confederate ostensibly received a diathermy treatment in front of them. Participants 
in an imagine-him pain condition were found to experience vasoconstriction 
reactions that were temporally related to when the diathermy machine was in 
operation (suggesting, with participant self-report, that participant reactions were 
tied to the situation of the other), while those in the imagine-self pain condition 
exhibited palmar sweating and self-reported in ways that were less temporally 
related to the operation of the machine.    
In a study that investigated instructional sets from a self-report perspective, 
Batson et al. (1997) asked undergraduate students to listen to an ostensible broadcast 
of a student describing her experiences after her parents had been killed in an 
automobile accident. Participants in either imagine condition reported greater (and 
not significantly different) empathic concern for the target than those in the objective 
condition, while those in the imagine-self condition reported greater personal in 
comparison to the two other groups (which did not significantly differ). It is well 
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documented that personal distress inhibits other-oriented responses (e.g., helping), 
while empathic concern increases such responses (Batson, 2011).  
In two later studies reported by Batson et al. (2003), participants in the 
imagine-other condition were significantly more likely to assign a positive task to 
another individual (opposed to themselves) than those participants the imagine-self 
condition and a condition where no perspective-taking instructions were given; in 
addition, participants who had imagined their own perspective were significantly 
more likely to choose to assign one raffle ticket each to themselves and a target 
rather than keep both tickets, in comparison to participants in the objective condition 
(the imagine-other perspective was not used). These findings suggest that while 
participants asked to perspective take using either instructional set report increased 
empathic emotion and behaviour, those who focus on their own point of view may 
not be as effective in formulating an empathic response. 
It is important to note that in both imagine-self and imagine-other conditions, 
participants report reflecting on both their own thoughts and experiences and those 
of the other person (e.g., Davis et al., 2004; Gerace et al., 2015). For example, in 
manipulation checks reported in the Batson et al. (1997) study, there was no 
significant difference in the extent to which participants in the imagine-self condition 
reported imagining their feelings and the feelings of the target person. In addition, 
those in the imagine-other condition reported imagining their own feelings to a 
greater extent than those in the objective condition (although they reported 
imagining the others’ feelings to a greater extent than imagining their own).  
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In a study involving a thought-listing procedure, recipients of imagine-self 
and imagine-target instructions differed (in the expected directions) in the number of 
self-reported and target-reported thoughts they listed after watching a talk show 
vignette (Davis et al., 2004). Interestingly, participants who were not given any 
instructions regarding perspective taking produced results most consistent with the 
imagine-target scenario, leading the researchers to suggest that real life (non-
induced) perspective-taking may be most consistent with the type of cognitive work 
of participants in an imagine-target condition. However, research by Vorauer and 
Sucharyna (2013) that investigated perspective taking in romantic relationship and 
close friendship dyads found that, in comparison to participants in a control 
condition where no specific perspective-taking instructions were given, participants 
who took an imagine-other (target) perspective overestimated the extent to which 
their values or preferences would be transparent to their relationship partner or 
friend; these participants also reported in a thought-listing task an increased focus 
on the self as an object of the other person’s evaluation. In both cases, imagine-self 
participant responses did not differ from those of control condition participants. 
Furthermore, a relationship between taking an imagine-other perspective and 
decreased relationship satisfaction was mediated by perceived transparency of one’s 
negative feelings.  
These findings raise an intriguing question: why does inferring the 
perspective of another involve the use of one’s own experiences and perspective? 
One explanation advanced is that perspective taking leads to increasingly similar 
mental representations of the self and the target (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
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1996). In one study, participants generated lists of traits to describe themselves, and 
then did so for a video vignette target. Instructions required participants take an 
imagine-self, imagine-other, or watch-target perspective. Results indicated that 
participants in the imagine-self or imagine-other perspective-taking groups ascribed 
a higher percentage of traits they had used to characterise themselves to the other 
person, than did those participants in the objective group. These results thus suggest 
that perspective taking may lead to a self-other merging or overlap, in a way which 
involves some level of application of what is known about the self to the other (see 
also Batson, Sager et al., 1997; Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, 
Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). This is not to say that perspective taking leads to more 
projection or activation of self-knowledge when targets are perceived as more like 
oneself. In fact, it has been reported that while participants in both an imagine-other 
and control condition demonstrated greater projection when exposed to a similar 
versus dissimilar target, imagine-other participants reported lesser projection 
compared to control participants for similar targets, and more projection for 
dissimilar targets (Todd, Simpson, & Tamir, 2016). In another study, self-other 
overlap was associated with more situational attributions for a romantic relationship 
partner (Aron & Fraley, 1999); situational attributions, as mentioned, are indicative 
of taking another person’s perspective (see Storms, 1973).  
Neuroscientific research has investigated shared and unique brain regions 
and neural activation associated with whether a person is focused on their own 
point of view and actions or that/those of another person (for a review, see Lamm, 
Decety, & Singer, 2011). At a theoretical level, the perception-action model (Preston 
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& de Waal, 2002) proposes that empathising with another person’s “state 
automatically activates the subject’s [empathiser] representations of the state, 
situation, and object, and that activation of these representations automatically 
primes or generates the associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless 
inhibited” (p. 4). However, as found in a number of studies, while there is “a widely 
shared network of activation between self and other representation” (Ruby & 
Decety. 2004, p. 995) when one focuses on either their own or another person’s 
perspective, there is also unique neural activation in a number of other areas 
indicative of self-other distinction (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Lamm, Batson, & 
Decety, 2007). 
Lack of self-other distinction and an excessive focus on one’s own emotions is 
likely to be problematic. In a study that examined both brain activation and self-
reported empathic responses, Lawrence et al. (2006) found that self-other overlap 
(measured using a procedure similar to that of Davis et al., 1996) was negatively 
associated with accuracy in judging bodily expressions using the Profile of 
Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979), 
and that higher trait personal distress (measured using the IRI; Davis, 1980) was 
associated with longer latency in labelling mental states. In concluding, the 
researchers suggested that “there is an optimal degree of reliance on first person 
knowledge in social perception and that a complete blurring of self and other is 
detrimental” (p. 1182), and that personal distress may have an inhibitory effect on 
other-oriented empathic responses.      
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Studies have also examined the type of perspective one takes to one’s own 
experiences. In particular, studies by Kross, Ayduk, and colleagues (for reviews see 
Ayduk & Kross, 2010a; Kross, 2009) present two ways of thinking about past 
experiences. The first is a self-immersed perspective, where people “visualize events 
happening to them through their own eyes”, and which is likely to involve a focus 
on what had occurred and was felt. The second is a self-distanced perspective, where 
examination of experiences occurs “from the perspective of an observer or ‘fly on the 
wall’” (Ayduk & Kross, 2010a, p. 843). This self-distanced perspective facilitates a 
focus on understanding the why of the experience, and leads to “reconstructing it in 
ways that promote insight and closure” (Kross, 2009, p. 36). While a self-immersed 
perspective is likely to lead to rumination and negative affect, a self-distance 
perspective is seen to involve more adaptive self-reflection. 
In one study, participants recalled an anger experience from one of the two-
perspectives, and with a focus on either the emotions felt (i.e. the “what” of the 
event) or the reasons for those emotions (i.e., the “why” of the event). Those 
participants in the self-distanced perspective group who focused on the reasons for 
their emotions, in comparison to participants in the three other groups, reported less 
implicit (using a word completion task) and self-reported anger and negative affect. 
In a follow-up study by the same authors, participants took one of the two 
perspectives (both groups focused on reasons for emotions), wrote about an anger 
experience, and reported on the extent to which, during the task, they experienced 
the emotions associated with the original event and the intensity of that experience. 
Narratives were analysed for two types of underlying construals: concrete 
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construals, where participants described experienced events, emotions, and 
behaviours, and attributed blame to another person; and abstract construals, where 
participants included “metacognitive insight statements describing a ‘realization’ 
about or change in the way the participant understood the causes underlying the 
event, his or her feelings, or his or her partner”, and “metacognitive closure 
statements … taking into account past and current experiences to make sense of the 
past” (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005, p. 713). There was support for a proposed 
mediational path where a self-distanced perspective led to less concrete versus 
abstract construals, resulting in decreased emotional reactivity. This mediational 
path has been replicated when self-focus is not manipulated; that is, participants 
report on how naturally immersed or distant they were when thinking about a 
negative past experience (Ayduk & Kross, 2010b). In an investigation involving in 
vivo provocations, the effects of a self-distanced versus self-immersed perspective on 
anger, aggressive thoughts and behaviours were in the expected directions 
(Mischkowski, Kross, & Bushman, 2012). 
There is also support for the effects of type of self-reflection on emotional and 
cognitive outcomes in clinical populations. Participants who had a current major 
depressive disorder were asked to engage in either experiential (focusing on 
experience of symptoms) or analytical (thinking about meaning of or evaluating 
symptoms) self-focus regarding their depressive symptoms (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2004). Participants in the experiential self-focus condition decreased significantly in 
their proportion of recalled overgeneral memories, which are implicated in 
depression. This appears somewhat contradictory to findings regarding the self-
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immersed and self-distanced perspectives. However, in this conceptualisation, 
analytical self-focus is of a more ruminative and less mindful self-awareness.  
In the last decade, an increasing amount of work has also been conducted on 
another other-oriented response turned inward: compassion toward the self (for a 
review, see Barnard & Curry, 2011). Neff (2003) defined self-compassion in the 
context of suffering or personal failure with reference to other-oriented compassion, 
and suggested that it involved:   
 
(a) self-kindness—extending kindness and understanding to 
oneself rather than harsh judgment and self-criticism, (b) 
common humanity—seeing one’s experiences as part of the 
larger human experience rather than seeing them as separating 
and isolating, and (c) mindfulness—holding one’s painful 
thoughts and feelings in balanced awareness rather than over-
identifying with them. (p. 89) 
 
These components imply a less ruminative, self-immersed perspective and a move 
toward insightful processing of one’s experiences. It has been reported that brooding 
(the rumination component of the Ruminative Responses Scale [RRS]; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) but not reflection (measured using the RRS reflection 
subscale) or worry partially mediated the relationship of self-compassion to 
depression, and that rumination and worry (but not reflection) partially mediated 
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the self-compassion and anxiety relationship (Raes, 2010; see also Neff, Kirkpatrick, 
& Rude, 2007).  
Unlike research on self-immersed and self-distanced perspectives (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2010a), work has been conducted to examine the relationship between self-
compassion and other-oriented empathy. In this work, higher self-compassion was 
associated with balancing one’s own and other people’s concerns, as well as more 
beneficial outcomes in relationship conflicts with family, friends, and partners 
(Yarnell & Neff, 2013; for study on self-perspective and problem solving, see Ayduk 
& Kross, 2010b). Higher self-compassion was also associated with perspective 
taking, empathic concern, and personal distress (negatively), as well as compassion 
for humanity, forgiveness, and altruism (Neff & Pommier, 2013).       
 
Discussion 
 In this review, we have documented theory and research relevant to an 
understanding of the role that self-reflection has to play in the perspective-taking 
process and, in particular, the use of similar past experiences to understand another 
person. Self-reflection and perspective taking are conceptualised as interdependent 
(e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1969), but there has been limited empirical 
investigation of the ways in which self-reflection might influence the taking of 
another person’s psychological point of view. Our review of the dominant research 
streams, namely those related to objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) 
and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), revealed, however, that the 
outcomes of self-reflection, such as increased accuracy in understanding thoughts, 
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feelings, and behaviours, are similar to those of perspective taking (Bernstein & 
Davis, 1982), although the focus of the individual is different (i.e., self versus other).  
What emerges is the importance of considering the purpose of reflecting on 
one’s thoughts, feelings, behaviours, and, most importantly, past experiences; and 
whether this involves more negatively-toned rumination or more positively-framed 
reflection and insight (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Rumination is negatively 
associated with perspective taking, while reflection that is driven by wanting to 
understand oneself is positively associated with taking the perspective of others. 
Clinical research further suggests that reflection and understanding (or ‘insight’) can 
be conceptualised as a process, in much the same way that perspective taking is 
considered a process (Dymond, 1950; Gerace et al., 2013), in which the individual 
becomes temporarily self-focused, but is aware and able to switch between a focus 
on himself or herself to that of the environment and others (Ingram, 1990). Taking an 
outsider’s perspective and moving away from one’s own perspective on experienced 
events is one way to develop such an understanding (Ayduk & Kross, 2010a; Batson 
et al., 1997; Kross, 2009).  
Drawing on this research, we believe that self-reflection on past experiences is 
a prerequisite for working toward any resolution of problematic experiences (Day et 
al., 2006; Stiles, 2001), and that this understanding can then be applied to 
interpreting others’ similar situations. While rumination and adverse reactions to 
problematic experiences may be inevitable, it is through the process of attempting to 
make sense of, and work through, such experiences (and understanding the 
associated thoughts, feelings, and behaviours), that self-reflection aids the process of 
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perspective taking. It is therefore likely that similar past experiences are insufficient 
in seeking to understand another person unless the experience has been reflected 
upon and assimilated. This helps to explain the mixed research findings regarding 
whether those with similar past experiences are more accurate in apprehending 
another’s experience (e.g., Hodges et al., 2010). It may be that when personal distress 
is prevalent, or there is not sufficient differentiation between self and other when 
trying to understand another person, accuracy is likely to be compromised 
(Lawrence et al., 2006).  
The literature reviewed herein raises a number of questions, both empirical 
and applied. Primarily, it seems important for future studies to directly examine the 
potential role of self-reflection and insight on past experiences in understanding 
others’ perspectives. Previous studies that examined different types of reflection 
(Ayduk & Kross, 2010a) on one’s own experiences did not investigate other-oriented 
perspective taking. Researchers could ask participants to generate a similar 
experience to a presented target’s and measure their rumination, more positively-
focused self-reflection, and insight into their particular past experiences or, indeed, 
encourage them to develop some insight and assimilation in vivo through taking a 
distanced perspective. Examination of whether this resulted in increased ability to 
take the other’s perspective, in terms of ease, accuracy, as well as emotional (e.g., 
empathic concern, personal distress) and behavioural responses (e.g., intentions to 
help, relationship-enhancing behaviours, aggression) could then be undertaken. 
Studies could examine participant retrospective experiences or those performed in 
experimental manipulations (e.g., Mischkowski et al., 2012), as well as using 
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experimental confederates/vignettes and actual existing relationships. For example, 
a study by Ayduk and Kross (2010b) involved couples reflecting on conflict and 
engaging in the laboratory, and this paradigm could be extended to other types of 
relationship. It is likely that, particularly in close relationships, self-other merging 
and perceptions of similarity to the other person would influence effects.  
The relationship between self-reflection and perspective taking is likely not to 
be straightforward and to be influenced by several factors. For example, there are 
likely specific situations where constructive self-reflection on and insight into 
experiences are detrimental to reaching an understanding of the other. This may 
become apparent when the individual has reflected and assimilated experiences, 
perhaps almost forgetting what it may be like to be at a different stage of working 
through the problem. It is also possible that ruminative involvement may actually 
make apprehending another’s experience more vivid and easier to imagine. Of 
course, due to the nature of rumination, insight into the experience is unlikely to 
occur, which would result in deficits in perspective-taking abilities and negative 
emotional reactions. Indeed, a degree of ambiguity is apparent in studies that have 
investigated the relationship between different types of self-reflection and empathic 
emotion, particularly empathic concern (Joireman et al., 2002b). The relationship of 
empathic concern to measures of emotional reactivity (Davis, 1983) could explain 
some of the ambivalence, but further research is needed to unpack the component of 
empathic concern and other responses such as personal distress. That self-
compassion is related to resolution of conflict suggests that the nature of the focus of 
this emotion (i.e., self versus other) is also important to consider.  
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Turning to applications based on previous and future work, one applied 
question is whether past experience reflection can be fostered through intervention. 
Although reflection makes it easier to take another’s perspective, it is not always 
undertaken – even when the individual has similar experience to draw upon (Gerace 
et al., 2015). Based on results from studies that induce self-awareness, as well as 
review of psychotherapeutic practices where inaccurate perceptions, cognitions, and 
notions are examined (e.g., Beck, 1976/1989; Ellis, 1977), it is nonetheless likely that 
this is possible. Indeed, engaging in positive abstract forms of self-reflection may be 
a more deliberate process than rumination and require intervention. Rumination, in 
particular, involves an almost automatic focus on the self, with situations or 
dispositions triggering a negative style of focus. This type of focus is inherently 
excessive or egocentric, fixed upon the self in a way that renders the other-focus 
required for perspective taking impossible (Joireman et al., 2002b). In comparison, 
conceptualisations of positive reflection imply self-awareness motivated by either a 
need for self-awareness or similar interests (Franzoi et al., 1990; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999). Thus, any focused attempts to increase reflection of the positive or 
adaptive type should serve to highlight the need and importance of accurate self-
related knowledge for understanding others, as well as eradicating problematic 
areas where self-reflection is avoided. The result would be heightened insight or self-
awareness, with direct benefits for perspective taking. 
It can be argued that not focusing on problematic situations and associated 
thoughts and feelings is recommended for people who have experienced particularly 
negative situations. In the short-term, a self-distanced perspective or distraction task 
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are similarly effective in reducing negative affect and thoughts about an experience 
(Kross & Ayduk, 2008), supporting proposals for the use of short-term distraction in 
facilitating problem solving and distress reduction in the presence of negative affect 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). However, a self-distanced 
perspective is more effective than a self-immersed focus or distraction task over 
time, suggesting that, eventually, some insightful processing of experiences is 
needed. 
A second question is whether the tendency to self-reflect is a disposition. This 
is important from an intervention point of view, where attempts are made to 
influence dominant or trait-like styles of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Since 
similar outcomes are evidenced in studies whether self-focused attention is 
manipulated or measured as a disposition, finding ways to increase self-reflection 
that occurs through environmental stimuli or related means to such an extent that it 
becomes a trait-like propensity (or tendency) could result in positive change (see 
Davis & Franzoi, 1991). In addition, since regular self-focus and attention – when 
positively motivated and framed – could lead to a greater complexity and 
understanding of experiences, this seems particularly useful to the process of taking 
another’s perspective. However, as most of the more recent research has employed 
dispositional measures of self-reflection, further investigation with methods to 
increase self-reflection (e.g., mirrors) is warranted. 
One clinical intervention concordant with the notion that self- and other- 
understanding are interdependent is chair-work. Although there are variants of this 
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tool, Greenberg, Elliott, and Lietaer (2003) describe the method (with two chairs) as 
follows:  
 
The therapist initiates the two-chair dialogue by suggesting that the client 
move back and forth between two chairs, each representing one self-aspect, in 
order to enact the internal conversation between the two parts … In the case 
of an attributional split, the client is asked to enact the other or external 
situation. (p. 318) 
 
The focus of chair-work on perspective taking, self-reflection, and self-insight may 
be particularly useful for people where problems in any of these areas are apparent 
(Day, Howells, Mohr, Schall, & Gerace, 2008).  
Fostering self-reflection in clinicians is also likely to help them to better take 
the perspective of their clients, to understand the therapeutic relationship, and to 
manage their own responses. The importance of self-reflection in clinical practice, 
including awareness of biases, boundaries, and emotional reactions to clients, is 
advocated in a number of disciplines (Day, 2012; Eng & Pai, 2015), and within 
psychology, this is reflected in the scientist-practitioner model (Blair, 2010). For 
example, clinical supervision and peer debriefing are interpersonal methods that are 
commonly used to facilitate such reflection (Peternelj-Taylor & Yonge, 2003). Other 
methods such as a clinician’s visualizing a previous interaction as a play on a stage 
(Somerville & Keeling, 2004) also encourage a self-distanced perspective (Kross, 
2009).  
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Therapists are also encouraged to reflect on their own past experiences in 
order to improve their taking of clients’ perspectives. However, this needs to be 
done prudently, particularly given that professional distance and lack of self-
disclosure is advocated in the helping disciplines (Gerace, Oster, O’Kane, Hayman, 
& Muir-Cochrane, 2016; Peternelj-Taylor & Yonge, 2003; Rogers, 1957). Hermansson 
(1997), for example, discusses the nature of boundaries in counselling and 
psychotherapy, which is similar to an understanding of perspective taking as 
involving both self- and other-information (Gerace et al., 2013). According to 
Hermansson, “to be empathic, a counsellor has to move across a boundary into the 
life space of the client. … To maintain therapeutic potency, however, it must be a 
qualified boundary cross, with the counsellor never totally leaving his or her own 
personal territory” (p. 140).  
 
Implications for Close Relationships 
While we anticipate that the main tenets of the proposed relationship between 
self-reflection and perspective taking investigated in this article apply to interactions 
between people with different degrees of acquaintance, more research has focused 
on interactions between new acquaintances or even unseen strangers. There is 
comparatively less research investigating self-reflection and perspective taking with 
close relationship partners. However, in close relationships, partners may be 
particularly motivated to understand and communicate with one another due to 
factors such as the ongoing nature of the relationship, interdependence, and 
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commitment (Goodwin, Fiske, Rosen, & Rosenthal, 2002; A. M. Gordon & Chen, 
2013).   
As discussed, focusing on the other person’s perspective (taking an imagine-
other perspective) rather than imagining oneself in their position (imagine-self 
perspective) results in more other-oriented focus, empathic emotion, and behaviour 
(Batson et al., 1997, Batson et al., 2003). Similarly, reflecting on one’s experiences 
from a distanced vantage point akin to taking an imagine-other perspective leads to 
more insight into one’s experiences (Ayduk & Kross, 2010a). However, in research 
examining the effects of these instructional sets in romantic relationships and 
friendships (Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013), participants in imagine-other conditions 
erroneously believed that their point of view would be more transparent to a 
relationship partner than what it was. While based on limited investigation, this 
suggests that in relationships with increased connection, there may be the tendency 
to attribute too much knowledge to, or not being able to distance from, a relationship 
partner. Indeed, as the researchers suggested, perceived transparency of one’s own 
perspective may lead to less communication of one’s thoughts, feelings, and past 
experiences to a partner; in turn, the partner may then form an inaccurate or 
different perception of the other’s point of view and relationship experiences.    
Another factor that may influence the extent to which individuals use self-
reflection to understand others is perceived similarity (e.g., values, preferences) to a 
close relationship partner. In studies investigating perspective taking in non-intimate 
relationships, perceptions of similarity can lead to projection of one’s own thoughts, 
feeling, and beliefs when trying to understand that other person’s behaviour (Ames, 
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2004, cf. Todd et al., 2016). While these studies show that in less close relationships 
this can lead to inaccurate perceptions and, in the case of self-reflection, 
inappropriate use of past experiences to understand others, in close relationships 
similarity perceptions can influence relationship outcomes such as satisfaction. 
Within romantic relationships, the picture is complex, with studies finding that 
people in unhappy marriages more often erroneously assumed that they were 
similar to their partners and exhibited less empathic accuracy than did people in 
happy marriages (Dymond, 1954), whilst other studies have highlighted the positive 
effects of inaccurate perceptions of similarity (Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & 
Dolderman, 2002; for a review, see Fletcher & Kerr, 2010). These findings suggest 
that perceptions of a relationship or interaction partner may help or hinder the 
empathiser’s attempts to use knowledge about the self to understand a relationship 
partner, and for the other partner to feel understood. 
It is also likely that other personality factors beyond trait self-reflection or 
perspective taking are important in close relationships. For example, in a series of 
studies by A. M. Gordon and Chen (2013), participants who experienced greater 
power in their relationship reported less consideration of, and were less accurate in 
understanding of, their romantic relationship partner’s perspective when more self-
focused (e.g., being individualistic or competitive) than other-focused (e.g., 
appreciating and seeing a partner and relationship as important to one’s own self-
construal). Similarly, in an investigation of the association between attachment styles 
and trait empathy (Joireman, Needham, & Cummings, 2002a) perspective taking and 
empathic concern were related to measures denoting secure attachment (e.g., 
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depending on relationship partners, being close to partners, including sharing 
thoughts and feelings) and less avoidant approaches to relationships; personal 
distress was related to measures indicating anxiety, avoidance, and less secure 
relationship attachment.    
It seems appropriate, therefore, that encouraging use of multiple strategies to 
consider one’s partner’s perspective (e.g., imagine-other, imagine-self, and 
remaining objective) using methods outlined such as chair-work may ameliorate 
empathic problems stemming from inaccurate perceptions or traits of partners. In 
addition, encouraging relationship partners to share their thoughts and feelings with 
their partners is also likely to improve both perspective taking, through the ability to 
clarify perceptions, and the relationship, through relationship partners 
demonstrating effort to understand one another. Across several studies, perceptions 
of one’s partner’s perspective taking have been found to be a stronger indicator of 
relationship satisfaction than the partner’s self-reported perspective-taking tendency 
or actual accuracy (Cohen, Schulz, Weiss, & Waldinger, 2012; D. Cramer & Jowett, 
2010; Hodges et al., 2010; Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998). Similarly, regarding 
past experiences, disclosure of similar past experience to a stranger target is 
associated with greater target perceptions of being understood; like other 
perspective-taking studies, this effect is regardless of actual empathiser accuracy 
(Hodges et al., 2010). This suggests that relationship satisfaction may arise from 
interactional factors such as sharing one’s own perspective, rather than solely 
accurate perception, though the association between more accurate perception and 
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relationship satisfaction (Dymond, 1954; Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013) highlights the 
importance of insight and understanding.  
To investigate self-reflection and perspective taking in close relationships 
dyadic approaches are likely required. A promising and under-utilised model of 
social interaction developed and investigated by Davis and colleagues (Davis & 
Kraus, 1991; Davis & Oathout, 1987, 1992) proposes that individual dispositions, 
most relevant to the present discussion being perspective-taking propensity, lead to 
specific behaviours in interpersonal relationships that are, subsequently, evaluated 
by the other individual in the relationship, and lead to outcomes such as satisfaction. 
Such a model could be used to investigate further the role of self-refection and 
perspective taking in close relationship processes, as well as the main components of 
the model being used in interventional work with couples. 
In couple counselling and therapy this would likely involve addressing how 
relationship partners see one another, believe they are perceived, and communicate 
their thoughts, feelings, and understanding to the other person (see Benson, McGinn, 
& Christensen, 2012). Increasing the use of specific behaviours (such as empathic 
listening, responsiveness, and taking time to hear the other’s perspective) would also 
help to enhance both self-and other-awareness (Benson et al., 2012; Finkenauer & 
Righetti, 2011). Approaches such as emotion-focused therapy and emotionally 
focused therapy that examine individuals’ conceptions of self and others, including 
addressing these conceptions and how individuals process past interactions and 
experiences, may be particularly helpful in this respect (Busby & Gardner, 2008; R. 
N. Goldman & Greenberg, 2013; Johnson, 1996; Makinen & Jonhson, 2006); as are 
Self-reflection and another person’s perspective 
47 
 
approaches that examine how relationship partners conceptualise the relationship in 
their ideas about the self (Acitelli, Rogers, & Knee, 1999). While acknowledging the 
limited empirical research in the area, Block-Lerner, Adair, Plumb, Rhatigan, and 
Orsillo (2007) further advocate for the utility of mindfulness and acceptance-based 
methods – reflected in psychotherapeutic interventions such as acceptance and 
commitment therapy, mindfulness-based stress reduction, and mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy – to improve empathy between couples, particularly in the context 
of conflict or rumination.   
 
Conclusion 
In this review, we suggest that a useful way to understand others is to self-
reflect and focus on one’s own past experiences. The most pressing areas for 
intervention and research are to increase the extent to which individuals draw on 
appropriate previous experiences in empathic situations and to further examine how 
these processes play out in different relationships. In addition, encouraging 
individuals to think about their experiences outside of the specific empathy episode 
should be fostered (i.e., self-reflection), which would allow for more positive self-
reflection and the development of insight, and a move away from rumination and 
personal distress. The focus of intervention, then, would be on providing individuals 
with methods to make it easier to perspective take, through making the use of past 
experiences a more-often utilised, and appropriately used, skill. 
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